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I. INTRODUCTION
Two of the most recent Latin American constitutions, the Co-
lombian Constitution of July 19911 and the Brazilian Constitution
of October 1988,2 embody exceptionally ambitious attempts to af-
ford constitutional protection to individual rights. Both constitu-
tionalize a vast array of individual and collective rights, including a
number of potentially problematic affirmative rights. Moreover,
both devote considerable care and attention to the creation of pro-
1. CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE COLOMBIA [COLOM. CONST.] (July 20, 1991). The Spanish
text with indexes and brief commentary is published in GERMAN PLAZAS G., LA NUEVA CON-
STITUCI6N PRESENTE Y FUTURO DE COLOMBIA (TEXTO OFICIAL COMENTADO) (1991); REPOBLICA
DE COLOMBIA, ESCUELA SUPERIOR DE ADMINISTRACI6N POBLICA DE COLOMBIA (1991).
2. CONSTITUICAO DA REPOBLICA FEDERATIVA DO BRASIL [BRAZ. CONST.] (Oct. 5, 1988). The
Portuguese text is officially published by the Centro Grfico do Senado Federal, CONSTITUI-
VAO: REPOBLICA FEDERATIVA DO BRASIL (1988). For English translations, see CONSTITUTION OF
THE FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL (Centro GrAfico do Senado Federal 1990); Keith S.
Rosenn, 1988 Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil-Annotated English
Translation, in A PANORAMA OF BRAZILIAN LAW 383-518 (Jacob Dolinger & Keith S. Rosenn
eds. 1992).
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cedural and administrative mechanisms to ensure that these con-
stitutional rights will actually be enforced.
Unlike Brazil, Colombia's Constituent Assembly began with a
well organized and detailed draft prepared by a bright young team
of lawyers well versed in comparative constitutional law.3 Conse-
quently, Colombia's Constitution is far better organized and struc-
tured than Brazil's, which was drafted from scratch by the entire
559-member Congress, divided into eight committees. The organi-
zational superiority of the Colombian Constitution is reflected in
its treatment of fundamental rights, which are placed in a separate
chapter and divided into 31 separate articles. In contrast, the Bra-
zilian Constitution places fundamental rights into a single
humongous article 5, which has 77 subparts and 26 additional sub-
divisions. Some of these fundamental rights later reappear in sub-
sequent articles.' Yet the individual rights guaranteed by both
Constitutions are strikingly similar and signify an impressive ad-
vance in Latin American constitutionalism.
This study begins by comparing and contrasting the individual
rights that have been constitutionally guaranteed in Brazil and Co-
lombia. It then compares the procedural mechanisms created to
implement these rights. It concludes by suggesting the difficulties
both countries are likely to encounter in insuring that these indi-
vidual rights are afforded meaningful protection in practice.
II. A COMPARISON OF PROTECTED INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
A. The Right to Live
Both constitutions guarantee the right to live, but Colombia's
guarantees this right in broader terms than does Brazil's. Colom-
bia's Constitution states that the right to live is inviolable and
flatly prohibits the death penalty.5 On the other hand, Brazil's
Constitution permits imposition of the death penalty by military
3. PRESIDENCIA DE LA REPfJBLICA, PROYECTO DE AcTo REFORMATORIO DE LA CONSTITUcI6N
POLITICA DE COLOMBIA (Feb. 1991) [hereinafter PROYECTO]. For background on the events
leading to the drafting of the Colombian Constitution, see William Banks & Edgar Alvarez,
The New Colombian Constitution: Democratic Victory or Popular Surrender?, 23 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV. 39 (1991).
4. For a criticism of the organizational and structural flaws of the Brazilian Constitu-
tion, see Keith S. Rosenn, Brazil's New Constitution: An Exercise in Transient Constitu-
tionalism for a Transitional Society, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 773, 776-77 (1990).
5. COLOM. CONST. art. 11.
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tribunals, but only during periods of declared war.'
The draft version of Colombia's Constitution provided for a
right to die with dignity, 7 but this right disappeared in the final
text. While avoiding controversy concerning euthanasia, the dele-
tion lamentably left the right to die and to dispose of one's organs
for medical purposes constitutionally unprotected.
The introductory clause to Article 5 of the Brazilian Constitu-
tion guarantees to all Brazilians and resident aliens the inviolabil-
ity of several basic rights, inter alia, the right to live. The semi-
final draft of the Brazilian Constitution contained a bizarre provi-
sion, felicitously deleted in the final draft, that guaranteed a right
to live, even in cases of fatal illness. Curiously, the text to the in-
troductory clause of Article 5, which tracks that of previous Brazil-
ian Constitutions, does not guarantee the right to live, or any other
individual rights for that matter, to non-resident aliens, but the
language in the introductory clause should not be interpreted liter-
ally. Many of the rights set out in Article 5, including the right to
live, apply to everyone. On the other hand, some of these rights are
guaranteed only for Brazilians and resident aliens, while a few are
restricted solely to Brazilians.'
Unlike some Latin American constitutions,9 both the Brazilian
and Colombian constitutions avoid the questions of when life be-
gins and whether a fetus shall be deemed a living person. Both are
silent on the controversial issue of a right to an abortion, although
each contains language from which such a right might be inferred.
Article 15 of the Colombian Constitution guarantees the right to
personal and family intimacy,10 while Article 5(X) of the Brazilian
6. BRAZ. CONST. art. 5 (XLVI) (a). Brazil's Military Criminal Code permits imposition
of the death penalty for several crimes, including treason and espionage. C6DIGO PENAL
MILITAR [C.P.M.] arts. 355 (treason) & 366 (espionage) (Decree-Law No. 1.001 of Oct. 21,
1969).
. 7. The draft added the following final sentence to the guarantee of the right to live:
"The law that guarantees the right to die with dignity and to dispose of the organs of one's
own body shall respect the wishes of the person." PROYECTO, supra note 3, at 7.
8. Jacob Dolinger, Nacionalidade e direitos dos estrangeiros, in 2 COMENTARIOS A CON-
STITUIrAO 114-17 (F. Whitaker da Cunha coord. 1991).
9. E.g., CONSTITUCION POLfTICA DE LA REPOBLICA DE GUATEMALA, art. 3 (1985) ("The
State guarantees and protects human life from its conception, as well as the integrity and
security of the person."); CONSTITUcI6N POLITICA DEL PER0, art. 2 (1979) ("Every person has
the right . . . [t]o life . . . . Whoever is to be born shall be considered as born for all that
favors him or her.").
10. The right to intimacy was proposed in Article 20 of the Proyecto, which explained
that this right was intended to protect the private life of the individual and the family.
PROYECTO, supra note 3, at 123. Although a right to intimacy is defined mainly in terms of
662 [Vol. 23:3
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Constitution declares that intimacy and private life are inviola-
ble.1" Moreover, Article 42 of the Colombian Constitution, which
seems curiously misplaced under the heading of Social, Economic
and Cultural Rights, guarantees each couple the right to decide
freely and responsibly on the number of children they will have. In
a similar vein, Article 226 § 7 of the Brazilian Constitution makes
"family planning the free decision of each couple," forbidding "any
coercion on the part of official or private institutions." While gen-
erally understood to guarantee contraceptive and family rights
other than abortion,'" these constitutional provisions could con-
ceivably be interpreted broadly to guarantee a right to abortion."3
Finally, both Constitutions contain adaptations of the open-ended
Ninth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, suggesting that rights
unspecified in the constitutional text may also be regarded as con-
stitutionally protected. 4
privacy and secrecy, at its core arguably lies the autonomy of a woman's decision whether to
bear a child. In a classic article on the subject, Professor Kenneth Karst noted:
Because the decision to procreate implicates so intensely the values of intimate
association, significant state interference with the choice not to procreate also
requires justification by reference to state interests of the highest order ...
Coerced intimate association in the shape of forced childbearing or parenthood
is no less serious an invasion of the sense of self than is forced marriage or
forced sexual intimacy.
Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L. J. 624, 640-41 (1980)
(footnotes omitted).
11. Early commentary on this section of the Brazilian Constitution suggests little
awareness of the potential for developing the right of intimacy beyond the concept of the
tort liability for invasion of personal privacy. See, e.g., 1 PINTO FERREIRA, COMENTARIOS A
CONSTITUIQAo BRASILEIRA 79-80 (1989); 2 CELSo RIBEIRO BASTOS & IVES GANDRA MARTINS,
COMENTARIOS A CONSTITUICAO DO BRASIL 61-65 (1988).
12. Martha I. Morgan, Constitution-Making in a Time of Cholera: Women and the
1991 Colombian Constitution, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 353, 396 (1992). A similar guarantee
of freedom in family planning is found in Article 47 of the 1985 Guatemalan Constitution,
which also guarantees the right to life from the moment of conception in Article 3. CONSTI-
TUCI6N POLITICA DE LA REP0BLICA DE GUATEMALA, arts. 3, 47. See supra note 9.
13. Such broad interpretations are unlikely in Brazil and Colombia. Both countries are
heavily Catholic, have legislation imposing severe criminal penalties for abortion, and have
cultures that have inhibited women's access to family planning services. See Morgan, supra
note 12, at 390-92; Jim Russell, Reproductive Health: The United Nations Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women as a Catalyst for Change
in Colombia, 49 U. TORONTO FAc. L. REV. 106, 109 (1991); Jos6 Gomes de Oliveira, Com-
ment, Aborto, moral e direito: um tema para a constituinte, 295 REVISTA FORENSE [REV.
FOR.] 497 (1986) (Braz.).
14. BRAZ. CONST. art. 5(LXXVII) § 2; COLOM. CONST. art. 94. A prior version of the
Ninth Amendment, contained in Article 150 § 35 of the 1967 Constitution, was actually
relied upon by the Brazilian Supreme Court to invalidate portions of the National Security
Law. Judgment of February 21, 1968 (Vieira Netto), STF, 44 Revista Trimestral de Juris-
prudgncia [R.T.J.] 322 (Braz.), translated in KENNETH L. KARST & KEITH S. ROSENN, LAW
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On the other hand, Colombia, unlike Brazil, has ratified the
American Convention on Human Rights.15 Article 4(1) of that Con-
vention states that the right to live "shall be protected by law and,
in general, from the moment of conception." 6 Since Article 93 of
the Colombian Constitution provides that international treaties
and conventions recognizing human rights, if ratified by Congress,
shall prevail as domestic law, the Colombian courts are unlikely to
construe their Constitution creatively to include a right to
abortion.
B. The Right to Humane Treatment
In language that tracks Article 5 of the American Convention
on Human Rights,1 7 both the Brazilian and Colombian Constitu-
tions declare that no one shall be submitted to torture, cruel, inhu-
mane, or degrading treatment. 8 Colombia expands this guarantee
to include forced disappearance,"' though there is no explicit coun-
terpart for this provision in the Brazilian Constitution. The experi-
ence of other Latin American countries where, during certain peri-
ods, forced disappearance became a common method of depriving
inhabitants of their right to live, as well as all other due process
rights, suggests that enforcement of such a guarantee may be be-
yond the power or independence of most judiciaries in the region.
2 0
On the other hand, recent decisions of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights ordering Honduras to pay damages of 1.5 and 1.3
million lempiras ($750,000 and $650,000) respectively to the fami-
lies of victims of mysterious disappearances suggest that some re-
AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 113, 115-116 (Latin American Studies Series No. 28,
1975).
15. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69, re-
printed in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970).
16. Id. art. 4(1).
17. Id. art. 5(2) ("[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhumane, or de-
grading punishment or treatment").
18. COLOM. CONST. art. 12; BRAZ. CONST. art. 5(111).
19. COLOM. CONST. art. 12.
20. In the widely cited case of P&rez de Smith, Judgment of December 21, 1978, CSJN,
300 Fallos 1283 (Arg.), the Argentine Supreme Court openly admitted that the refusal of the
military government to cooperate by providing the Judiciary with information regarding the
whereabouts of thousands of persons who had mysteriously disappeared had rendered
habeas corpus an ineffective remedy and had produced "an absence of justice" in Argentina.
For background on this and companion cases, see Alejandro M. Garro, The Role of the
Argentine Judiciary in Controlling Governmental Action Under a State of Siege, 4 HUM.
RTs. L.J. 311, 332-37 (1983). See generally Howard M. Kleinman, Note, Disappearances in
Latin America: A Human Rights Perspective, 19 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1033-60 (1987).
664 [Vol. 23:3
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lief may be available through international legal process.
2 1
Article 17 of the Colombian Constitution prohibits slavery,
servitude and mistreatment of human beings. The Brazilian Con-
stitution contains no counterpart prohibiting slavery, but such a
guarantee seems implicit in Article 5(XV), which provides for free-
dom of movement for everyone during peacetime,
22 and in Article
5(XLII) and (XLIII), which declare the practice of torture, racism,
and other forms of inhumane or degrading treatment to be non-
bailable criminal offenses. Paradoxically, the latter provisions in-
vite human rights abuses by mandating non-bailable pretrial de-
tention for anyone merely accused of such offenses.
The Brazilian Constitution also contains several important
guarantees of prisoners' rights. It assures prisoners respect for
their moral and physical integrity;
3 requires that prisons be differ-
entiated in accordance with the nature of the crime, age, and sex of
the prisoner;2" and guarantees female prisoners the right to remain
with their children during the period they are breast-feeding.
25
C. Due Process
Both the Colombian and Brazilian Constitutions contain de-
tailed, extensive, and liberal due process guarantees, particularly in
criminal matters. Indeed, both incorporate a broad guarantee of
due process. The Brazilian Constitution practically adopts the due
process clauses of the 5th and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Con-
stitution, stating that "[n]o one shall be deprived of liberty or
property without legal due process."" The first sentence of Article
29 of the Colombian Constitution provides more generally that
"[due process shall apply to all types of judicial and administra-
21. Veldsquez Rodriguez, Inter-Am. C.J.R., OAS/ser. L/V/III 19, doc. 13 (1988)
($750,000 in damages); Godinez Cruz, Judgment of January 20, 1989, 25.5 HUMAN RIGHTS:
THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 209 (January 1991). See generally Juan E. M6ndez & Jos6
Miguel Vivanco, Disappearances and the Inter-American Court: Reflections on a Litigation
Experience, 13 HAMLINE L. REv. 507-77 (1990); Note, Governmental Liability for "Disap-
pearances": A Landmark Ruling by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 25 STAN.
J. INT'L L. 289-322 (1988).
22. BEAZ. CONST. art. 5(XV) ("Movement in national territory shall be free in peace-
time, with everyone being free, in terms of the law, to enter, remain or leave with his
property.").
23. BRAz. CONST. art. 5(XLIX).
24. Id. art. 5(XLVIII).
25. Id. art. 5(L).
26. Id. art. 5(LIV).
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tive proceedings." In the United States, due process has come to
have a controversial substantive as well as a procedural compo-
nent, permitting courts to examine the legitimacy of the legislative
end, as well as the reasonableness of the relationship between the
ends and the means.27 Whether either the Brazilian or Colombian
due process guarantees will be interpreted to include a substantive
component along the lines of that developed in the United States
remains to be seen.2 s
The procedural aspects of these due process guarantees are
made more concrete in Colombia and Brazil by specific provisions
that can be grouped under the headings of (1) retroactivity, (2)
arrest or detention, (3) right to a fair trial, (4) right to a speedy
trial, (5) presumption of innocence, (6) right to appeal, (7) double
jeopardy, (8) right to counsel, (9) self-incrimination and testimo-
nial privileges, (10) exclusion of illegally obtained evidence, (11)
cruel and unusual punishments, and (12) extradition.
1. Retroactivity
Both constitutions permit retroactivity in criminal matters
only for measures that favor the defendant.2 9 Colombia requires
that all persons be tried in conformity with preexisting laws. The
Brazilian guarantee is slightly broader. Nothing can be regarded as
a crime without a prior law,3 0 nor may any penalties be imposed
unless previously authorized by law. 1
27. For the history and meaning of substantive due process, see JOHN E. NOWAK & RON-
ALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 355-451 (4th ed. 1991).
28. In Vieira Netto, Judgment of February 2, 1968, STF, 44 R.T.J. 322 (Braz.), trans-
lated in KARST & ROSENN, supra note 14, at 113-18, the Brazilian Supreme Court declared
unconstitutional a provision of the National Security Law suspending from exercise the pro-
fessional or business activities of anyone accused of violating the statute. The vote of the
Reporter, Minister Cavalcanti, displayed a strong resemblance to U.S. substantive due pro-
cess cases, declaring that the National Security Law violated the right to life and other
unwritten substantive rights guaranteed by Article 150 § 35 of the 1969 Brazilian Constitu-
tion, which tracked the language of the Ninth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Never-
theless, Brazilian case law and doctrine has no real tradition of judicial appreciation of the
reasonableness of legislation. CARLOS ROBERTO DE SIQUEIRA CASTRO, 0 DEVIDO PROCESSO
LEGAL E A RAZOABILIDADE DAS LEIS NA NOVA CONSTITUIrAO DO BRASIL 186-191 (1989).
29. COLOM. CONST. art. 29; BRAZ. CONST. art. 5(XL).
30. BRAz. CONST. art. 5(XL).
31. Id. art. 5(XXXIX).
666 [Vol. 23:3
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2. Arrest or Detention
Article 28 of the Colombian Constitution contains a broad
guarantee of freedom from police interference without a judicial
order, declaring that no one can be molested, arrested, detained,
imprisoned, or even have his address registered without a written
order from a competent judicial authority. The terms of this guar-
antee would appear to make it unconstitutional for the police to
apprehend anyone without an arrest warrant were it not qualified
by Article 32, which permits anyone to arrest offenders appre-
hended in flagrante and allows authorities to pursue offenders into
their own homes or into another's home after requesting permis-
sion. The Brazilian guarantee is slightly less broad than Colom-
bia's, providing simply: "No one shall be arrested unless in
flagrante delicto or by written and substantiated order of a proper
judicial authority, except in the case of a military offense or
strictly military crime, as defined by law."3 2 Colombia's Constitu-
tion also prohibits administrative detention or imprisonment;
33 un-
fortunately, Brazil's Constitution contains no similar prohibition,
permitting continuance of the unfortunate practice of allowing per-
sons to be imprisoned through administrative procedures.
The Colombian Constitution requires that detainees be
brought before a judge within 36 hours,3' while the Brazilian Con-
stitution requires immediate communication of an arrest and the
place of detention to the proper judge and the arrestee's family or
a person designated by the judge.3 5 Lamentably, neither constitu-
tion guarantees a right to bail.36 Indeed, the Brazilian Constitution
even designates certain crimes as non-bailable. These crimes are
singled out solely because of a desire to express moral outrage
rather than the likelihood that the defendant may flee.
37
32. Id. art. 5(LXI).
33. COLOM. CONST. art. 26.
34. Id. art. 28.
35. BRAZ. CONST. art. 5(LXI).
36. Article 5(LXVI) of the Brazilian Constitution provides: "No one shall be taken to
prison or held therein when the law permits provisional liberty, with or without bond."'
BFAz. CONST. art. 5(LXVI). This is an illusory constitutional right to bail, tautologically stat-
ing that one has a right to be released with or without bond when the law so allows.
37. See, e.g., BRAZ. CONsT. art. 5(XLII) (racism); id. art. 5(XLIII) (torture and drug
trafficking); id. art. 5(XLIV) (actions of armed groups).
.1992]
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3. Right to a Fair Trial
Colombia's Constitution guarantees the accused the right of
defense, as well as the rights to a public trial, to present proof, and
to confront witnesses against him.38 Brazil's Constitution, which
often states guarantees in terms that apply to both criminal and
civil proceedings, guarantees to all litigants the right to reply and
the right to an ample defense.3 9 It also guarantees every prisoner
the right to identify those responsible for his detention or for his
interrogation by the police," as well as the right to be informed of
his rights, including the right to remain silent.4 1 The Brazilian
Constitution, unlike the Colombian Constitution, guarantees the
accused the right to a jury trial in all intentional homicides,42
which traditionally include a number of abortion-related crimes. "
The right to jury trial includes a full defense, secret voting, and
the sovereignty of the jury's verdict.44 The jury can be a valuable
institutional check on governmental arbitrariness and abuse, but
there is little evidence to suggest that the Brazilian jury actually
performs this function.
4. Right to a Speedy Trial
Colombia's Constitution specifically guarantees that trial must
proceed speedily, without any unjustified delays.45 Lamentably, the
Brazilian Constitution contains no similar guarantee. The Colom-
bian Constitution, however, does not indicate what sanctions, if
any, will be imposed for a violation of this guarantee. The criminal
justice systems of both Brazil and Colombia are characterized by
long delays with large numbers of criminal defendants languishing
in jail for extended periods awaiting trial.46 This problem is exacer-
38. COLOM. CONST. art. 29.
39. BRAz. CONST. art. 5(LV).
40. Id. art. 5(LXIV).
41. Id. art. 5(LXIII).
42. Id. art. 5(XXXVIII).
43. These offenses are set out in Articles 124-128 of Brazil's Penal Code. See ADRIANO
MARREY, ET AL., JORI-TEORIA E PRATICA 238-46 (3d ed. 1988).
44. BRAZ. CONST. art. 5(XXXVIII). The "sovereignty of the jury's verdict" simply
means that judges may not substitute their judgment for that of the jury's. A reviewing
court, however, may set aside a jury verdict and remand for a new jury trial if it finds that
the verdict was manifestly against the weight of the evidence. RIBEIRo BASTOS & GANDRA
MARTINS, supra note 11, at 208-09.
45. COLOM. CONST. art. 29.
46. GABRIEL RICARDO NEMOGA SoTo, EL ESTADO Y LA ADMINISTRACION DE LA JUSTICIA EN
668 [Vol. 23:3
LATIN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS
bated by the limited statutory rights to bail. 7 This is likely to be
an area where the gap between the Colombian constitutional norm
and practice remains large for a long time.
5. Presumption of Innocence
Colombia's Constitution states that everyone is presumed in-
nocent until a judge has determined that the accused is guilty.
8
Brazil's Constitution states this guarantee more broadly, curiously
and illogically extending the presumption of innocence until one's
criminal conviction has become final and nonappealable.
49
6. Right to Appeal
Unlike the U.S. Constitution, Colombia's Constitution com-
mendably guarantees the accused the right to appeal. If only the
defendant appeals, the appellate tribunal may not increase his sen-
tence. 0 Regrettably, Brazil's Constitution contains no similar
guarantee.
7. Double Jeopardy
Colombia's Constitution explicitly guarantees the accused the
right not to be tried twice for the same offense.
1 Although Brazil's
Constitution does not explicitly guarantee that an accused may not
be tried twice for the same offense, in most cases such prosecutions
will be barred by the similar, albeit weaker, guarantee of the prin-
ciple of res judicata.52
COLOMBIA 165-71 (1990); COMISI6N ANDINA DE JURISTAS SECCIONAL COLOMBIANA, SISTEMA JU-
DICIAL Y DERECHOS HUMANOS EN COLOMBIA 174-175 (1990) [hereinafter COMISI6N ANDINA];
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1991, 102D
Cong., 2D Sess. 513, 517 (1992) (Jt. Rep. to House Comm. on For. Affs. & Sen. Comm. on
For. Rel.) [hereinafter DEPARTMENT OF STATE].
47. Colombia's new Code of Criminal Procedure, which went into force on July 1, 1992,
permits release of those persons detained for more than 180 days without triaL This provi-
sion was recently suspended by presidential decree to avoid releasing a substantial number
of suspected narcotraflickers. Colombia prolonga medidas de emergencia, EL MIAMI HER-
ALD, July 14, 1992, at 3A. Article 310 of Brazil's Code of Criminal Procedure, Decree-Law
No. 3.931 of Dec. 11, 1941, grants the judge discretion to allow an arrested person to remain
in a state of provisional liberty.
48. COLOM. CONST. art. 29.
49. BRAZ. CONST. art. 5(LVII).
50. COLOM. CONST. art. 31.
51. Id. art. 29.
52. BRAz. CONST. art. 5(XXXVI). See FERREIRA, supra note 11, at 150; 4 FERNANDO DA
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8. Right to Counsel
Colombia's Constitution guarantees the accused the right to a
lawyer chosen by him or ex officio during the investigation and
trial. The Brazilian constitutional guarantee is stated in much
broader terms, guaranteeing the right to the assistance of a lawyer
not only to persons who have been arrested, 3 but to all indigents
in civil proceedings as well."' The Brazilian Constitution also con-
fers constitutional status on the Public Defender, which is to be
organized as a career with life tenure.5 5 Both countries, however,
have had serious problems in insuring that the right to assistance
of counsel, which was also guaranteed under prior constitutions, is
more than perfunctory."6 The right to counsel would be much
stronger if stated in terms of a right to competent assistance of
counsel at all critical stages of the proceedings, as well as the right
to additional support services, such as experts and investigators.
9. Self-Incrimination and Testimonial Privileges
Colombia's Constitution not only grants the accused broad im-
munity from testifying against himself but also extends testimonial
immunity to spouses, companions, and relatives up the fourth de-
gree of consanguinity." Granting these relatives a constitutional
privilege against testifying simply continues prior law, but none-
theless appears excessive. Brazil's Constitution simply provides
that persons under arrest must be informed of their rights, among
which is the right to remain silent.58 Colombia's guarantee against
self-incrimination would be more effective if the authorities were
required to advise arrestees of this constitutional right. Brazil's
guarantee against self-incrimination would also be more meaning-
ful if the Brazilian courts were to declare unconstitutional Articles
186 and 198 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which permit the
COSTA TOURINHO FILHO, PROCESSO PENAL 240-41 (10th ed. 1987).
53. BRAz. CONST. art. 5(LXIII).
54. Id. art. 5(XXIV).
55. Id. art. 134.
56. Joaquim Falc&o, Lawyers in Brazil, in LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: THE CIVIL LAW WORLD
400-42 (Richard L. Abel & Phillip S.C. Lewis eds. 1988); Roberto Rosas, A Advocacia-Geral
da Uniao, in A CONSTrTUI AO BRASILEIRA 1988 INTERPRETAVOES 268, 276 (II F6rum Juridico,
2d ed. 1988); COMISION ANDINA, supra note 46, at 86-87; DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note
46, at 549-554.
57. COLOM. CONST. art. 33.
58. BRAZ. CONST. art. 5(LXIII).
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courts to infer guilt from the accused's exercise of his right to re-
main silent.5 9
10. The Exclusion of Illegally Obtained Evidence
Both constitutions commendably bar the use of illegally-ob-
tained evidence. Colombia's Constitution provides that evidence
obtained in violation of due process is null and void.
60 In Brazil,
evidence obtained by unlawful means is deemed inadmissible in all
proceedings. 1 The courts in both countries will have to work out
on a case-by-case basis when evidence is obtained in violation of
due process or illegally, and how far down the chain of causation
the taint of the constitutional violation will extend.
11. Cruel and Unjust Punishment
Both constitutions ban a number of punishments deemed
cruel or unjust. Both prohibit the death penalty, but only Colom-
bia's prohibition is complete." Brazil permits use of the death pen-
alty in times of declared war." The Brazilian Constitution specifi-
cally prohibits courts from sentencing convicted defendants to life
imprisonment, forced labor, banishment, or any other cruel pun-
ishment.6 No penalty may extend to someone other than the con-
victed party, but the obligation to indemnify the victim and a de-
cree of confiscation of the defendant's property may extend to the
defendant's successors.6 The Colombian Constitution, on the
other hand, prohibits the penalties of banishment, life imprison-
ment, and confiscation. A court may, however, deprive a defendant
of property obtained by unjust enrichment at the expense of the
59. Article 186 of Brazil's Code of Criminal Procedure provides: "Before starting the
interrogation, the judge shall advise the accused that although he is not obliged to answer
the questions that were put to him, his silence can be interpreted to prejudice his own
defense."
Article 198 provides: "The silence of the accused does not signify a confession, but it
may constitute an element in the formation of the judge's determination." In Colombia, on
the other hand, the judge may not draw any negative inference when an accused exercises
the right to remain silent. GUSTAVO PELAEZ VARGAS, MANUAL DE PRUEBAS PENALES 142
(1981).
60. COLOM. CONST. art. 29.
61. BRAZ. CONST. art. 5(LVI).
62. COLOM. CONST. art. 11.
63. BRAz. CONST. art. 5(XLVII)(a).
64. Id. art. 5(XLVII).
65. Id. art. 5(XLV).
1992]
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
state or grave deterioration of social morals.66
The Brazilian formulation is superior with respect to confisca-
tion, for it is difficult to see any real justification for denying to the
courts the power to confiscate the proceeds of criminal activity.
While the phrase "grave deterioration of social morals" in the Co-
lombian Constitution is unclear, restricting judicial power to con-
fiscate the property of those who are criminally convicted looks
lamentably like special patrimonial protection for drug traffickers.
Banning both the death penalty and life imprisonment indicates a
confidence in the rehabilitative capacity of imprisonment that is
probably unwarranted.
12. Extradition
Both constitutions treat the privilege of not being extradited
for crimes committed abroad as a fundamental right, sharply limit-
ing the power of the government to extradite its own citizens.6 7 No
native-born Brazilian may be extradited, and naturalized
Brazilians may be extradited only for crimes committed prior to
naturalization or for involvement in narcotics. 6 Brazil may extra-
dite foreigners, but not for political crimes or opinion.69 The Co-
lombian Constitution prohibits extradition of native-born citi-
zens, 70 but is curiously silent with respect to imposing any
restrictions upon extradition of naturalized Colombians. As does
Brazil, Colombia prohibits extradition of foreigners for political
crimes or opinion. 71 Colombia's Constitution even contains an ob-
viously unenforceable guarantee that Colombians who commit
crimes abroad that are also crimes in Colombia will be tried in
Colombia. 2
Conventionally, the right not to be extradited is not regarded
as fundamental, nor are there any reasons for constitutionalizing
such a right other than extreme nationalism or political expedi-
66. COLOM. CONST. art. 34.
67. Both constitutions also contain language guaranteeing respect for the international
practice of granting political asylum. Brazil's Constitution simply states that Brazil will be
governed by the principle of conceding political asylum. BRAZ. CONST. art. 4(X). Colombia's
Constitution recognizes the right to asylum in the terms provided for by law. COLOM. CONST.
art. 36.
68. BRAz. CONST. art. 5(LI).
69. Id. art. 5(LII).





ency. Extradition has been a highly controversial political issue,
particularly in Colombia, and its constitutional treatment of the
subject represents a political compromise designed to diminish the
violence directed towards anyone involved in the extradition of
narcotraffickers.
D. Equal Protection
Both Constitutions contain equal protection clauses, but Co-
lombia's is more extensive. The first paragraph of Article 13 of the
Colombian Constitution broadly embodies the principle of nondis-
crimination. It provides that all persons are equal before the law,
shall receive the same protection and treatment by the authorities,
and shall enjoy the same rights, liberties, and opportunities, with-
out discrimination on the basis of sex, race, national or family ori-
gins, language, religion, or political or philosophical opinion. The
next paragraph constitutionally mandates adoption of affirmative
action programs favoring groups that have been victims of discrim-
ination or marginalization. Resolution of the obvious tension be-
tween the principles of nondiscrimination and affirmative action
will have to be developed by the courts, for it is difficult to advan-
tage one group without disadvantaging others.
Brazil's equal protection clause is contained in the introduc-
tory clause to Article 5, which provides: "All are equal before the
law, without distinction of any nature. . . ." Neither Brazil's nor
Colombia's equal protection clause can be read literally, particu-
larly with respect to aliens, for other constitutional provisions per-
mit certain kinds of legal discrimination that is inconsistent with
the principle of equal protection. 3 Since neither country has a de-
veloped body of equal protection doctrine or caselaw, the complex-
ities of equal protection analysis will have to be developed by the
courts on a case-by-case basis.
73. Article 100 of Colombia's Constitution states a general reciprocity principle: A for-
eigner enjoys the same civil rights in Colombia as his own country grants to Colombians.
This is qualified by permitting the legislature to enact laws that subject foreigners to special
conditions for public policy reasons, and by permitting the law or the Constitution to limit
the guarantees of rights for aliens. Brazil imposes a series of restrictions against foreign
individuals with respect to the practice of certain professions and owning rural land and
against foreign-owned firms in the areas of mining, petroleum, informatics, and government
contracting. See KEITH S. ROSENN, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN BRAZIL 157-73 (1991).
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E. The Right to Vote
Both constitutions guarantee the right to vote in very broad
terms. Article 14 of the Brazilian Constitution states that "popular
sovereignty shall be exercised by universal suffrage through direct
and secret vote, with equal value for all." Article 40 of Colombia's
Constitution guarantees the right to vote to all citizens, a right re-
iterated in the form of a secret ballot in Article 258. Neither con-
stitution excludes illiterates from voting, but Brazil requires liter-
acy in order to be eligible to run for public office. 74 Both
constitutions disenfranchise aliens and most minors. Brazil's Con-
stitution dubiously allows juveniles as young as 16 to vote in all
elections, while Colombia's requires that voters be at least 18 un-
less the law provides otherwise. 75 Brazil's Constitution curiously
disenfranchises conscripts during their period of obligatory mili-
tary service,76 while Colombia's disenfranchises all members of the
military and national police while in active service. 7 The Brazilian
Constitution curiously makes voting mandatory for all literate per-
sons between the ages of 18 and 70, and optional for illiterates,
those aged 16 and 17, and those older than 70.78 The Colombian
Constitution contains no mandatory voting requirement.
The language in Article 14 of the Brazilian Constitution stat-
ing that votes are to have "equal value for all" is likely to generate
a great deal of litigation from voters from more heavily populated
electoral districts. Far more clearly than in the United States, the
Brazilian Constitution confers a claim that failure to establish dis-
tricts with equal numbers of voters has debased the value of the
votes of more populous districts in violation of their constitutional
right to have their votes weighted equally.79
74. BRAZ. CONST. art. 14 § 4.
75. COLOM. CONST. arts. 98-99.
76. BRAZ. CONST. art. 14 § 2.
77. COL. CONST. art. 219.
78. BRAz. CONST. art. 14 § 1.
79. The United States Supreme Court has construed the Equal Protection Clause and
the language of Article 1 § 2-that congressional representatives be elected "by the peo-
ple"-to mandate periodic redistricting of electoral districts so that they are approximately
equal in population. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (mandating one-person, one-
vote apportionment for state legislatures); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (mandat-
ing one-man, one-vote apportionment for congressional districts). See generally Robert B.
McKay, Reapportionment: Success Story of the Warren Court, 67 MICH. L. REv. 223 (1968);
Gerhard Casper, Apportionment and the Right to Vote: Standards of Judicial Scrutiny,
1973 SUP. CT. REv. 1 (1973). For subsequent developments, see John R. Low-Beer, Note,
The Constitutional Imperative of Proportional Representation, 94 YALE L.J. 163 (1984).
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F. Freedom of Speech and of the Press
Both rnstitutions contain powerful guarantees of freedom of
speech. Both prohibit prior censorship and provide commendably
broad protection for free speech and a free press.
Article 20 of the Colombian Constitution guarantees freedom
to express and disseminate one's thoughts and opinions, freedom
to inform and to receive true and impartial information, and free-
dom to found mass means of communication. The mass media are
declared to be both free and socially responsible, which makes
them liable for defamation or similar torts. Article 23 guarantees
the right to petition the government for reasons of both public and
private interest, while Articles 37 and 38 protect freedom of assem-
bly and association. Article 73, which originally simply reiterated
Article 20, has been amended to guarantee professional liberty and
independence to journalists.
The Brazilian Constitution contains several free speech and
free press provisions that significantly broaden the nature of the
prior constitutional guarantees by eliminating prior censorship.
80
Whereas prior free speech and press guarantees were concisely
stated in a single article, they are now widely dispersed in a series
of sometimes overlapping or redundant provisions. In comparison
with the Brazilian guarantees of freedom of speech and press, Arti-
cle 20 of the Colombian Constitution is a model of precision. The
first Brazilian provision is Article 5(IV), which cryptically states:
"Manifestation of thought is free, anonymity being prohibited."
Article 5(IX) then overlaps and somewhat confusingly expands this
guarantee by providing: "Expression and communication of intel-
lectual, artistic, and scientific activity are free, independent of any
censorship or license." More than two hundred articles later, these
guarantees are reiterated.81
80. The draft of the Colombian Constitution contemplated prior censorship with the
approval of the Constitutional Court for dissemination of information that might generate
grave and imminent danger to the life of persons or public security or perturbed public
order. PROYECTO, supra note 3, at 126. This exception was eliminated by the Constituent
Assembly.
81. Article 220 provides in relevant part:
The expression of thoughts, creation, speech and information, through whatever
form, process or vehicle, shall be subject to no restrictions, observing the provi-
sions of this Constitution.
§1. No law shall contain any provision that might constitute an impedi-
ment to the full freedom of information by the press in any medium of
social communication, observing the provisions of art. 5 (IV), (V), (X),
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The Brazilian Constitution also creates a vague, undefined
constitutional right to information, as well as a constitutional
shield that may enable journalists to protect their sources. It as-
sures everyone "access to information, safeguarding the secrecy of
sources whenever necessary for the exercise of one's profession. '82
All of these guarantees are qualified, and to a certain extent under-
mined, by provisions designed to safeguard actions for libel, slan-
der, and the protection of privacy. Thus, Article 5(V) safeguards "a
right of reply, proportional to the injury," as well as a right to com-
pensation for material and moral damages. It also safeguards a
right to indemnification for damages to one's image, although what
that adds to material and moral damages is unclear.
G. Freedom of Religion
Both Constitutions contain ample guarantees of freedom of re-
ligion. Both also strongly suggest that no conscientious objector
may be compelled to perform military service.
Colombia's Constitution guarantees freedom of religion, as
well as the right freely to profess one's religion and to spread one's
religion either individually or collectively. All religious and church
confessions are declared to be free before the law.8 3 In addition,
Colombia's guarantees liberty of conscience, stating that no one
shall be molested -because of personal convictions or beliefs, nor
compelled to reveal them or act against one's conscience.8 4
Brazil's Constitution makes liberty of conscience or belief invi-
olable and assures free exercise of religion. 5 Protection of places of
worship and rendering of religious assistance to civil and military
entities is also assured, but this is a very weak guarantee, for it is
assured only "in terms of the law."8 6 No one may be deprived of
rights because of religious beliefs or philosophical or political con-
(XIII), and (XIV).
§2. Any and all censorship of a political, ideological and artistic nature is
prohibited.
The remainder of Article 220 permits the federal government to inform the public about the
nature of shows and exhibitions and to establish means by which the public can defend
itself against unwanted radio and TV programs. It also permits government regulation of
advertisements for tobacco, alcohol, agrotoxics, and medicines.
82. BRAZ. CONST. art. 5(XIV).
83. COLOM. CONST. art. 19.
84. Id. art. 18.
85. BRuz. CONST. art. 5(VI).
86. Id. arts. 5(VI)-(VII).
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victions, unless they are invoked to avoid a legal obligation im-
posed upon everyone and one refuses to perform alternative
service."
H. Right to Privacy
Both Constitutions contain direct guarantees of personal pri-
vacy. Colombia's guarantees to all the right to personal and family
intimacy and their good names, imposing a duty upon the State
not only to respect these rights but also to make others respect
them.8  Brazil's states that a person's intimacy, private life, honor,
and image are inviolable and assures indemnification for material
and moral damages for violation of these rights.
8 9 The Brazilian
Constitution also strongly guarantees the privacy of one's home,
particularly during the night. Entry into a dwelling is permitted
without permission only in cases of flagrante delicto, disaster or
rescue, or with a court order, but then only during daytime.
9 0 Co-
lombia's guarantee of the privacy of one's home is not as clearly
articulated. Authorities in hot pursuit may follow a fleeing suspect
into the suspect's own home, but if the suspect flees into a neigh-
bor's home, the authorities must request permission from the
resident.9 1
Both Constitutions guarantee the secrecy of correspondence,
data, and telegraphic and telephonic communications, permitting
interception only by judicial order.9 2 Brazilian courts may issue
wiretap or intercept authorizations only in connection with crimi-
nal investigations or prosecutions.9 Colombia's Constitution spe-
cifically authorizes the government to require presentation of ac-
count books and other private documents for tax or judicial
purposes as determined by statute,9" an authorization deemed un-
necessary by the drafters of the Brazilian Constitution.
It is hard to predict what flesh may ultimately be placed upon
the privacy and personal intimacy skeletons set forth in the Brazil-
ian and Colombian Constitutions. As a matter of comparison, a few
87. Id. art. 5(VIII).
88. COLOM. CONST. art. 15.
89. BRAZ. CONST. art. 5(X).
90. Id. art. 5(XI).
91. COLoM. CONST. art. 32.
92. COLoM. CONST. art. 15; BRAz. CONST. art. 5(XII).
93. BRAZ. CONST. art. 5(XII).
94. COLOM. CONST. art. 15.
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years ago the Argentine Supreme Court utilized the privacy provi-
sion contained in Article 19 of the Argentine Constitution to inval-
idate a statute criminalizing possession of narcotic drugs for per-
sonal use.9 5 Also, the U.S. Supreme Court discovered a privacy
right in the penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and
Ninth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and utilized it to in-
validate statutes that had criminalized the use of contraceptives"
and abortion. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, refused to ex-
tend this privacy principle to invalidate a statute that had
criminalized sodomy between consenting adults in private 8 or to
permit parents of a hopelessly comatose accident victim to discon-
nect life support systems. 9
III. PROCEDURAL MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
The drafters of both constitutions were well aware that merely
guaranteeing individual rights in a constitution is by itself insuffi-
cient to insure that such rights are actually respected in practice.
Both countries have long traditions of unenforced or under-
enforced constitutional rights. Hence, the drafters recognized the
need for procedural mechanisms to permit the courts to remedy
alleged violations of constitutional rights. They were also well
aware that a great many abuses of individual rights have occurred
during states of siege and other states of exception when basic con-
stitutional controls are relaxed. Consequently, both constitutions
reflect significant efforts by the drafters to ensure that individual
constitutional rights will be respected in practice.
A. States of Exception
The new Brazilian Constitution commendably places impor-
95. Judgment of Aug. 29, 1986 (Bazterrica), CSJN, [1986-D] Revista Juridica Argen-
tina-La Ley [L.L.] 550 (1986); Judgment of Aug. 29, 1986 (Capalbo), CSJN, [1986-D] L.L.
582 (1986) (Arg.). These decisions were not always followed by the Argentine lower courts.
In 1990, after a successful court packing maneuver by the Menem regime, the Argentine
Supreme Court effectively overruled this line of cases. Judgment of Dec. 11, 1990 (Ernesto
Alfredo Montalvo), CSJN, [May 24, 19911 LA LEY 4 (unbound version) (Arg.). For back-
ground on the right to privacy in Argentina, see DELIA MATILDE FERREIRA RUBIO, EL DER-
ECHO A LA INTIMIDAD (1982).
96. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
97. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
98. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), reh'g denied, 478 U.S. 1039 (1986).
99. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 197 U.S. 261 (1990).
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tant constraints upon the Executive's power during times of emer-
gency. The President may declare a state of defense for up to 60
days whenever public order or social peace is threatened and may
decree restrictions upon the rights of assembly and the secrecy of
the mails, telephones, and telegraphs.
00 During this period, the
Executive may imprison persons for up to ten days for crimes
against the State, provided the imprisonment is communicated to
an appropriate judge and the prisoner is not maintained incommu-
nicado. The declaration of the state of defense must be submitted
to Congress for ratification within 24 hours.
°'0 The President may
declare a state of siege only if authorized to do so by Congress, and
then only in cases of grave commotion or a state of war or its
equivalent. During a state of siege, the Executive has the power:
(1) to require that persons remain in a determined place; (2) to
detain persons in places hot used to house persons convicted of
common crimes; (3) to restrict liberty of the press and other com-
munication media; (4) to violate the secrecy of correspondence and
other forms of communication; (5) to suspend freedom of assem-
bly; (6) to commit searches and seizures in homes; (7) to intervene
in public services; and (8) to requisition property.1
0 2 A state of
siege for reasons of grave commotion cannot be decreed for more
than 30 days, nor can it extend for longer than 30 days at a time.
Colombia's Constitution has established even greater re-
straints than Brazil's on the powers of the Executive to curtail in-
dividual rights during states of exception. During a state of inter-
nal commotion, no civilian may be investigated or tried by criminal
military courts. 03 Moreover, legislative decrees issued by the Exec-
utive during a state of exception may not suspend human rights or
fundamental liberties. In all cases, the rules of International Hu-
manitarian Law must be respected. The legislature is required to
enact a statute that will regulate governmental powers during a
state of exception and to set up judicial controls to protect individ-
ual rights, in conformity with international treaties.
04 Measures
100. BRAZ. CONST. art. 131 § 1.
101. Id. art. 136 § 4. Congress must decide whether to ratify the state of defense within
10 days.
102. Id. art. 139.
103. COLOM. CONST. art. 213.
104. These conventions include:
1. The Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, approved by
Law No. 5 of 1960.
2. The International Pact on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, approved by
Law No. 74 of 1968.
6791992]
680 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:3
adopted by the Executive during a state of exception must be pro-
portional to the gravity of the actual facts, a provision that invites
meaningful judicial scrutiny.105 Colombia's Constitution also im-
poses liability upon the President and his cabinet ministers for any
abuses committed during states of exception.10 e Because states of
exception historically have lasted for years, Colombia's new Consti-
tution sharply limits their duration. States of exception usually
may last only 90 days; Senate authorization is required to prolong
them for an additional 180 days.
B. Procedural Measures to Enforce Constitutional Rights
The drafters of both constitutions determined that existing
procedures were inadequate to protect constitutional rights. There-
fore, they created or borrowed several intriguing procedural inno-
vations designed to protect constitutional and legal rights. Both
countries have long had the Anglo-American writ of habeas
corpus."0 7 In addition, Brazil's 1934 Constitution created the writ
3. International Pact of Civil and Political Rights, approved by Law No. 74 of
1968.
4. Optional Protocol of the International Pact on Civil and Political Rights, ap-
proved by Law No. 74 of 1968.
5. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation, approved by Law No. 22 of 1981.
6. Convention for the Prevention and Sanction of the Crime of Genocide, ap-
proved by Law No. 28 of 1959.
7. Convention on the Statute of Refugees, approved by Law No. 35 of 1961.
8. Protocol on the Statue of Refugees, approved by Law No. 65 of 1979.
9. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, approved by Law No. 51 of 1981.
10. International Convention on the Repression and Punishment of Crimes of
Apartheid, approved by Law No. 26 of 1987.
11. Convention on the Political Rights of Women, approved by Law No. 35 of
1986.
12. Convention on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment
or Punishments, approved by Law No. 70 of 1986.
13. Convention on the Rights of Children, approved by Law No. 12 of 1991.
14. Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, approved by Law No. 16 of
1972.
PROYECTO, supra note 3, at 201-02. The conventions are conveniently collected in CON-
SEJERIA PARA DESARROLLO DE LA CONSTITUCI6N, Los DERECHOS CONSTITUCIONALEs: FUENTES
INTERNACIONALES PARA SU INTERPRETACI6N (1991).
105. COLOM. CONST. art. 214(2).
106. Id. art. 214(5).
107. Brazil was the first Latin American country to adopt habeas corpus, which was
anticipated in the 1830 Penal Code and regulated in the 1832 Code of Criminal Procedure.
Phanor J. Eder, Habeas Corpus Disembodied: The Latin American Experience, in XXTH
CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW 463, 465 (Kurt H. Nadelmann et al. eds., 1961).
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of security (mandado de seguranga) to protect any liquid and cer-
tain right unprotected by habeas corpus, a writ generally effective
as a summary procedure to protect against illegal or abusive acts of
public authorities.10 8 In 1910, a Colombian constitutional reform
created the popular action, which permits any citizen to challenge
the constitutionality of any law on its face in a suit filed directly
before the Supreme Court."0 9
1. Habeas Corpus
Habeas corpus is now a constitutionalized remedy in both
countries to protect against illegal deprivations of liberty."10 The
Colombian Constitution guarantees the right to bring an action of
habeas corpus before any judge at any time if a detainee believes
that he has been deprived of liberty illegally. The judge to whom
the request for habeas is addressed has 36 hours in which to de-
cide."' The Brazilian guarantee of habeas corpus is significantly
broader than the Colombian guarantee. Habeas corpus may be
brought in Brazil not only when one has been detained, but also
when one has been merely threatened with a constraint on his lib-
erty by illegality or abuse of power." 2 If the imprisonment is ille-
gal, the judge must immediately relax the restraint."' Moreover,
illegality includes unconstitutionality; hence the writ of habeas
corpus is frequently used in Brazil to challenge the constitutional-
ity of statutes and executive acts.
In Colombia, Article 1 of Law 27 of 1963, and Articles 56-64 of Decree 1358 of 1964 created
habeas corpus, which was subsequently regulated by articles 417-25 of the 1971 Code of
Criminal Procedure and articles 454-66 of the 1987 Code of Criminal Procedure.
108. Jost CRETELLA JONIOR, Do MANDADO DE SEGURANVA (3d ed. 1984); J.M. OTHON
SIDOu, Do MANDADO DE SEGURANCA (3d. ed. 1969); ARNOLD WALD, Do MANDADO DE
SEGURANCA NA PRATICA JUDICIARIA (3d ed. 1968).
109. The history of the popular action is set out in Luis CARLOS SACHICA, CONSTITUCION-
ALISMO COLOMBIANO 96-105 (8th ed. 1991); J.A.C. Grant, Judicial Control of the Constitu-
tionality of Statutes and Administrative Legislation in Colombia: Nature and Evolution of
the Present System, 23 S. CAL. L. REv. 484, 496-504 (1950).
110. Habeas corpus has been a constitutional remedy in Brazil since the 1891 Constitu-
tion. BRAZ. CONST. (1891) art. 72 § 22. Colombia's present Constitution is the first to make
habeas corpus an explicit constitutional guarantee.
111. COLOM. CONST. art. 30.
112. BRAZ. CONST. art. 5(LXV).
113. Id. art. 5(LXVI).
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2. The Collective Writ of Security
The Brazilian Constitution expands the writ of security to
make it explicitly applicable to illegality or abuse of power com-
mitted not only by public authorities, but also by agents of private
legal entities exercising public authority. 1 ' More importantly, the
new Constitution creates a collective writ of security to alleviate
some of the problems stemming from the limited nature of class
actions and the lack of a well-developed doctrine of stare decisis,
which have generally required each person aggrieved by an partic-
ular law or regulation to bring an individual writ of security to ob-
tain relief.1 5 Now any political party represented in Congress, or
any union, business syndicate or association, legally constituted for
more than one year, may bring a collective writ of security to de-
fend the rights of its members or associates." 6
3. Habeas Data
The Brazilian Constitution imports from Portugal a new ac-
tion called habeas data, which has also been adopted in the new
Colombian Constitution, albeit without calling it by that name." 7
This action allows anyone to discover information the government
has about the plaintiff in its data banks and to rectify that data if
it is incorrect. The draft of the Colombian Constitution, which
used the terminology habeas data, contemplated excusing the gov-
ernment from releasing data for national security purposes," 8 but
this exception was eliminated by the Constituent Assembly.
The Brazilians adopted habeas data as a reaction to the
abuses of the military governments that secretly gathered and
stored information that was used against citizens without their
114. BRAZ. CONST. art. 5(LXIX). This change in the constitutional text reflects the ori-
entation of the prior case law of the Brazilian courts. Sydney Sanches, Inovabes proces-
suais na constituigao federal de 1988, 304 REVISTA FORENSE [REV. FOR.] 210 (1988) (Braz.).
115. Since 1964, Brazil has had a kind of stare decisis in the form of the samula, which
is a series of short legal rules capsulizing points of law authoritatively decided by the appel-
late courts. Brazil lacked any class action until 1985, when Law No. 7.347 of July 24, 1985,
created a class action limited to protection of three types of injuries: (1) environmental; (2)
consumer; and (3) cultural. Keith S. Rosenn, Civil Procedure in Brazil, 34 AM. J. COMP. L.
487, 513-14, 522 (1986).
116. BRAz. CONST. art. 5(LXX). See generally Athos Gusmo Carneiro, 0 mandado de
seguranca coletivo e suas caracteristicas bsicas, 316 REv. FOR. 35 (1991) (Braz.).
117. BRAZ. CONST. art. 5(LXXII); COLOM. CONST. art. 15.
118. PROYECTO, supra note 3, at 123.
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having the opportunity to contest the accuracy of that information.
Habeas data is a sensible reaction to the invasions of privacy pro-
duced by technological advancement in the area of data processing
and storage. A number of habeas data actions have already been
brought successfully in the Brazilian courts. These courts have
taken the position that the action will be deemed appropriate only
after the administrative authority has refused to act upon a spe-
cific request by the interested party.' 9
4. Amparo or Tutela
Article 86 of the Colombian Constitution creates a tutela ac-
tion to protect fundamental rights. Although denominated an ac-
tion of tutela rather than amparo, its characteristics are that of
amparo: a preferential and summary procedure that may be
brought by the affected person or that person's representative that
will result in immediate protection of the individual's fundamental
constitutional rights when they are violated or threatened by an
action or omission of any public authority.' 20 Whether a right is
specifically enumerated in the constitutional text under Title II,
Chapter 1 (Articles 11-41), which is denominated "Fundamental
Rights," is not decisive as to whether a right is fundamental for
the purposes of protecting it by an action of tutela. The Constitu-
tional Court recently reversed an appellate court for denying a
tutela action because the action sought to protect a right to educa-
tion, which is enumerated under Title II, Chapter 2, denominated
"Social, Economic and Cultural Rights." Utilizing an intricate and
eclectic interpretive technique, the Constitutional Court indicated
that it will decide for itself whether a particular right is sufficiently
fundamental to be protected by the action of tutela.'
2
119. Caio Tfcito, Judicial Control of Administrative Action in Brazil, in A PANORAMA
OF BRAZILIAN LAW 47 (Jacob Dolinger & Keith S. Rosenn eds., 1992). Eight requests for
habeas data were filed in the Supreme Court on the day after promulgation of Brazil's Con-
stitution. GAZETA MERCANTIL, Oct. 7, 1988, at 5. For a general discussion of habeas data, see
J.M. Othon Sidou, Las neuvas figuras del derecho procesal constitucional brasileho:
mandado de injunqao y habeas data, 24 BOLETIN MEXICANO DE DERECHO COMPARADO 169-87
(1991).
120. See HECTOR Fix ZAMUDIO, LA PROTECCI6N PROCESAL DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS
ANTE LAS JURISDICCIONES NACIONALES 100-33 (1982). The legislature ia authorized to enact a
statute permitting the action of tutela to be brought against private parties who render
public services or whose conduct gravely or directly affects collective interests. COLOM.
CONST. art. 86.
121. Judgment of May 8, 1992 (Pastora Emilia Upegui Norefia), 21 Jurisprudencia Y
Doctrina [Juris. Y Doct.] 490, 492-501 (1992) (Colom.).
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The action of tutela makes Colombia an unusual hybrid, com-
bining a decentralized form of judicial review with a constitutional
court. Countries with constitutional courts generally prohibit any
other courts from exercising the power of judicial review.'22 In Co-
lombia, however, an action of tutela can be brought in any court,
which may then issue an order protecting the right. The judge has
only 10 days in which to render a decision, which is to be carried
out immediately. If the decision is challenged, its validity may ulti-
mately be determined by the newly created Constitutional Court,
which is thereby in a position to revise decisions of not only the
intermediate appellate courts, but also those of the Supreme Court
and the Council of State, which had hitherto been courts of last
resort.
The constitutional text states that the action of tutela may be
brought only if the affected party has no other means of judicial
defense except some measure that might be used temporarily to
avoid irreparable harm. 2 3 To prevent the ordinary courts from sti-
fling development of the tutela action, the Constitutional Court
has sensibly interpreted this restriction as applying only to situa-
tions where the affected party can resort to an alternative judicial
procedure that can provide immediate and effective protection to
the threatened constitutional right.'
The action of tutela has been regulated by Decree 2591 of
1991, which expressly forbids its use to challenge judicial decisions
because of erroneous interpretations of the law or to challenge the
evidence. It also prohibits its use to challenge interlocutory judicial
decisions.'25 The initial decisions interpreting the reach of this
statute have attempted to confine it narrowly to prevent the action
of tutela from being used as a substitute for appeal. The action of
tutela will not lie against judicial decisions that have become res
judicata,'26 against administrative acts,"' against striking judicial
122. MAURO CAPPELLETTI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 46-66 (1971).
123. COLOM. CONST. art. 86.
124. Judgment of May 11, 1992 (Luz Marina Motta de Manrique v. Gobernador de
Huila), 21 Juris. Y Doct. 502, 507-509 (1992) (Colom.).
125. COLOM. CONST. art. 40.
126. Judgment of Oct. 1, 1992, Constitutional Court, cited in La tutela se juega su
futuro, EL ESPECTADOR, Oct. 4, 1992, at 1; Judgment of Jan. 23, 1992 (Melania Arias Lima et
al), Supreme Court Cham. Civil Cass., 21 Juris. Y Doct. 150 (Colom.). See Supreme Court
decisions of Dec. 9, 1991 and Jan. 17, 1992 and Council of State decision of Jan. 21, 1992,
cited in 21 Juris. Y Doct. 237, 238 (1992) (Colom.).
127. Judgment of Feb. 17, 1992 (Gerardo Solarte Rosero), Chamber of Civil Cass., 21
Juris. Y Doct. 239 (Colom.).
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functionaries,'18 or as a substitute for appeal.'
5. The Direct Action of Unconstitutionality
Under the 1969 Brazilian Constitution, the Supreme Court
had the power to determine the unconstitutionality of any law or
normative act on its face, a decision with erga omnes effects,1 80 but
standing to bring such an action, called a representation
(representaqao), was the exclusive province of the Procurator Gen-
eral."' In the current Constitution, representation has been
renamed the direct action of unconstitutionality. Standing to bring
the action has been expanded to include the President, the Direc-
tors (Mesas) of the Senate or House of Representatives, state gov-
ernors, the Federal Council of the Brazilian Bar Association, any
political party represented in Congress, and any national labor or
business association.3 ' Brazil's direct action of unconstitutionality
is still much more restricted than Colombia's popular action, which
permits any citizen to challenge the constitutionality of any statute
directly before the Constitutional Court.133 Brazil's modification of
the representation action represents a very substantial increase in
the ability of its Supreme Court to declare laws and statutes
unconstitutional.
Both the popular action and the direct action of unconstitu-
tionality have the unfortunate effect of depriving the highest con-
stitutional courts of the benefit of the opinions of the lower courts,
of seeing the actual effect of the statute on litigants, and of being
able to duck untimely or too sensitive matters by imposing barriers
to justiciability. Indeed, these direct actions involving abstract dec-
larations of unconstitutionality may eventually embroil Colombia's
Constitutional Court and Brazil's Supreme Court in an undue
amount of conflict with the other branches of government.
128. Judgment of Jan. 23, 1992 (Jos6 Leonidas y Jos6 Dario Bustos Martinez), Supreme
Court en banc, 21 Juris. Y Doct. 180 (Colom.).
129. Judgment of Mar. 11, 1992 (Hernando Jai Hernfndez), Chamber of Civil Cass., 21
Juris. Y Doct. 324 (Colom.).
130. BRAZ. CONST. (1969) art. 118(0).
131. Judgment of Mar. 10, 1971 (Movimento Decmocrftico Brasileiro v. Procurador-
Geral da Repfiblica), Supremo Tribunal Federal en banc, 59 R.T.J. 333 (Braz.).
132. BRAZ. CONST. arts. 102(a) & 103.




Article 87 of Colombia's Constitution permits every person to
bring an action before the courts to enforce a law or administrative
act. Article 88 states that the law shall regulate popular actions for
the protection of collective rights and interests relating to public
patrimony, space, security and health, administrative morals, the
environment, free economic competition and others of similar na-
ture. It also provides for a class action to deal with damages that
are suffered by numerous persons, without prejudice to their bring-
ing private actions.
Brazil has long had a popular action allowing any cit: ,en to
sue to nullify any act injurious to the public patrimony.' The
1988 Constitution expands this popular action to include acts that
injure administrative morality, the environment, and historic or
cultural patrimony. 135
Article 89 of the Colombian Constitution permits the legisla-
ture to establish other types of actions, appeals, or procedures that
may be brought for the protection of individual rights or collective
interests when faced with an action or a mission by public authori-
ties. Article 90 imposes liability upon the states for damages result-
ing from actions or omissions of public authorities. Article 91 im-
poses liability on a governmental agent that manifestly violates a
constitutional precept to the detriment of an individual.
C. The Self-Executing Nature of Individual Rights
Both constitutions make most individual rights self-executing.
Article 85 of the Colombian Constitution provides that the individ-
ual rights protected by the Colombian Constitution, with a few ex-
ceptions, apply immediately.' 36 In addition, Article 84 provides
134. BRAZ. CONST. (1934) art. 113(38). See generally Josig AFONSO DA SILVA, AQAo PoPu-
LAR CONSTITUCIONAL: DOUTRINA E PROCESSO (1968).
135. BRAZ. CONST. art. 5(LXXIII).
136. The draft had taken the position that all fundamental rights guaranteed in the
constitution were self-executing, but the Constitution has taken the approach of specifically
identifying which rights are self-executing. The only fundamental rights not deemed self-
executing are those contained in Article 22 and Article 25. Article 22, which makes peace a
constitutional right and duty, is a provision that presents obvious problems of enforcement;
Article 25, which makes labor a right and social obligation and provides that every person
has the right to a job in dignified and just conditions, is an aspirational provision whose
enforceability is also clearly problematic. Another provision that is not designated as self-
executing is somewhat surprising: The right to bring criminals apprehended in flagrante
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that if a right or activity has been regulated in a general manner,
the authorities may not require permits, licenses, or additional re-
quirements in order for persons to exercise these rights or
activities.
Article 5 § 1 of the Brazilian Constitution provides that "the
rules defining fundamental rights and guarantees are applicable
immediately." This provision, taken from the Portuguese Constitu-
tion of 1976, is problematic because a number of the fundamental
rights are guaranteed only in terms of the law.137 Because of Bra-
zil's long history of under-enforcement of constitutional rights and
the large number of programmatic constitutional provisions that
require enactment of implementing legislation,' 8 the drafters of
Brazil's Constitution created two new procedural institutions: the
action of unconstitutionality for omission; and the mandate of in-
junction (mandado de injunqdo).
1. Action of Unconstitutionality for Omission
An action of unconstitutionality for omission, a concept bor-
rowed from the Portuguese Constitution of 1976, can be brought
directly before the Brazilian Supreme Court whenever the failure
to adopt a statute or regulation makes a constitutional norm inef-
fective. 139 In the case of a legislative omission, the Supreme Court
can try to cajole the legislature into issuing the necessary legisla-
tion by notifying the legislature that it has a constitutional duty to
adopt the measure. If the culprit is an administrative agency, the
delicto before a judge and to pursue these offenders into their own homes or into the homes
of neighbors. Certain of the other individual rights that are not regarded as self-executing
are the right not to be extradited, the right of asylum, the right of free association, and the
right of employees and employers to form syndicates or associations without state
intervention.
137. See e.g., BRAZ. CONST. art. 5(VI) (assuring free exercise of religion as set forth in
law); id. art. 5(XV) (any person may enter or leave the country with his property under the
terms of the law); id. art. 5(XXVI) (protecting small rural properties, as defined by law,
from attachment for debts and requiring the law to provide for ways to finance their
development).
138. In 1989, the Brazilian Ministry of Justice published a study entitled Leis a
elaborar, indicating that in 256 instances the constitutional text expressly requires enact-
ment of legislation and that 87 other parts of the constitutional text implicitly require com-
plementary legislation. While the Brazilian Congress has been notoriously dilatory in enact-
ing complementary legislation, this study exaggerates the problem because implementing
legislation had already been on the books in a number of areas. Caio Tficito, 0 Direito A
Espera da Lei, 181-82 REVISTA DE DIREITo ADMINISTRATIvo 38, 40 (1990) (Braz.).
139. BRAZ. CONST. art. 103 § 2.
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Supreme Court has the power to direct that the necessary adminis-
trative actions be adopted within thirty days.
2. The Mandate of Injunction
The mandate of injunction may be granted "whenever the lack
of regulatory rules makes exercise of constitutional rights and lib-
erties and the prerogatives inherent in nationality, citizenship or
sovereignty infeasible."14 The mandate of injunction is a misno-
mer that bears little resemblance to the Anglo-American injunc-
tion. The poorly drafted constitutional provision, which has pro-
duced considerable confusion and controversy, has not yet been
regulated. In the meantime, the Brazilian Supreme Court has held
that the remedy is self-executing but that until it is regulated, the
courts should use the procedures established for the writ of
security.1
4 '
The promise of the mandate of injunction, which some com-
mentators saw as a mandate enabling the courts to formulate and
apply temporary rules to permit enforcement of constitutional
rights in concrete cases, 42 has not been fulfilled. Thus far, the Su-
preme Court has been reluctant to grant writs of injunction. When
it has, the Court has refused to remedy the violation, taking the
position that its duty is simply to call the omission to the attention
of the Congress. 143 Under this interpretation, the mandate of in-
junction essentially duplicates the action of unconstitutionality for
omission.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite these ample and well-defined constitutional guaran-
tees, the enforcement of individual rights will continue to be prob-
lematic in both Brazil and Colombia without significant strength-
ening of the judiciary. Maladministration of justice has long been a
140. Id. art. 5(LXXI). If the failure to issue the required rules is attributable to the
President, the Congress, or the superior federal courts, the Supreme Court has original juris-
diction of mandate of injunction actions. Id. art. 101(I)(q). If the failure is attributable to
some other federal agency or authority, the Superior Tribunal of Justice has original juris-
diction. Id. art. 105(I)(h).
141. Rosenn, supra note 4, at 797.
142. See, e.g., Barbosa Moreira, Brazilian Civil Procedure: An Overview, in A PANO-
RAMA OF BRAZILIAN LAW 183, 204-05 (Jacob Dolinger & Keith S. Rosenn eds., 1992).
143. Mandado de Injunqdo No. 219 of Aug. 22, 1990, cited in TAcito, supra note 138, at
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serious problem in Brazil and Colombia. Lengthy delays have
caused serious denials of justice. Both countries have grave
problems with death penalties being imposed by paralegal groups,
such as death squads and lynch mobs. This reflects a serious lack
of confidence in the abilities of their criminal justice systems to
apprehend, to try, and to punish dangerous criminals.14 ' Torture
and maltreatment of prisoners is a common occurrence in Brazilian
police stations, jails, and prisons. 1"5 Colombia has had chronic
problems with uncontrollable violence, disappearances, torture,
and violations of due process." It also has a serious problem with
the intimidation of judges by all too credible threats of violence. 7
In both countries, the great bulk of deprivations of individual
rights have gone unpunished.
Both constitutions contain a number of provisions designed to
improve judicial independence and efficiency. For example, both
Constitutions try to free the courts from executive tutelage by per-
mitting the judiciary to prepare its own budget requests for Con-
gress. 8 Colombia's new Constitution goes much further than Bra-
zil's in seeking to reform the judicial system. For example, it
replaced its system of investigative magistrates with a U.S.-style
system of professional prosecutors. It has created a new Constitu-
tional Court and has attempted to turn the Procurator General
into an independent watchdog who will be elected by the Senate
rather than appointed by the President. The Procurator General
heads the Public Ministry, which will house a newly created insti-
tution called the Public Defender (El Defensor del Pueblo), who is
charged with the promotion, publication, and exercise of individual
144. See, e.g., MARIA C9LIA PAOLI ET AL., A VIOL]NCIA BRASILEIRA (1982); COMISI6N
ANDINA, supra note 46, at 197-217; Palacio Castafteda, The Crisis of and Alternatives to the
State Judicial Monopoly at the End of the 20th Century: Exploratory Notes on the Colom-
bian Case, in 1 MAS ALLA DEL DERECHO: BEYOND LAW 21, 35-43 (1991); German Palacio
Castafieda, Administracibn de justicia, los jueces y la crisis institucional en Colombia: con-
tradicciones y dilemas, 1 JURIMPRUDENCIAS 33, 37-42 (1990) (Colom.).
145. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, BEYOND THE LAW: TORTURE AND EXECUTION IN URBAN
BRAZIL (June 1990); DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 46, at 487; Sandra Faria, El sistema
carcelario brasilero: perspectivas para la dcada del 90, 2 JURIMPRUDENCIAS 103, 110-117
(1991) (Colom.).
146. COMISI6N ANDINA, supra note 46; DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 46, at 549-54.
147. Luz E. Nagle, The Rule of Law or the Rule of Fear: Some Thoughts on Colombian
Extradition, 13 Loy. L.A. INT'L & Comp. L. J. 851, 867-870 (1991); Keith S. Rosenn, The
Protection of Judicial Independence in Latin America, 19 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 7
(1987).
148. BRAZ. CONST. art. 99; COLOM. CONST. art. 256(5).
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rights.'49 Yet it is doubtful that these impressive measures will by
themselves be sufficient.
Both countries need to invest considerably more resources in
the judiciary to attract the best and the brightest members of the
legal profession into judicial careers. Substantial sums need to be
spent on continuing judicial education to imbue the judiciary with
a meaningful sense of its critical role in protecting and preserving
individual rights. Civil and criminal procedures have to be stream-
lined and modernized to enable the courts to dispose of pending
cases more speedily. Considerable sums need to be spent on pro-
tecting judicial independence from being undermined by terrorism
and corruption.
Yet even if the judiciaries of Brazil and Colombia can be per-
suaded to change their mentalities and to make unprecedented ac-
tivist efforts to try to ensure the protection of individual rights, the
courts alone cannot make effective protection of such rights a real-
ity. Substantial resources must be invested to upgrade the caliber
of the police and to improve their training. Underfunded and
poorly trained police forces are incapable of coping with the high
levels of crime in Brazil and Colombia.1 50 Until this basic defi-
ciency is remedied, police and other security force are unlikely to
make serious efforts to respect constitutional rights and liberties.
Moreover, the general population must be educated with re-
spect to which rights are constitutionally guaranteed and how
these rights can be asserted. People also have to be taught to value
and respect these rights. Substantial sums have to be devoted to
making legal assistance to the indigent and the quasi-indigent
truly effective. In short, without a widespread societal commitment
to the notions that individual constitutional rights are of the high-
est importance and that a considerable amount of resources, time,
and collective effort has to be dedicated to their protection, the
impressive efforts of the drafters of these Constitutions to insure
that respect for fundamental human rights becomes a reality will
be unsuccessful.
149. COLOM. CONST. arts. 281-284.
150. See Alvaro Lazzarini, Seguranca pfiblica e o aperfeioamento da policia no Brasil,




Since this article went to press, Brazil has ratified the Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights. On October 21, 1992, a formal
complaint was filed with the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, seeking condemnation of Brazil for the slaying of
111 inmates at the Carandiru Prison in Sio Paulo on October 2,
1992.151
151. OAS Condemnation of Brazil Sought, MIAMI HERALD, October 22, 1992, at A18.
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